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High-Powered Incentives and
Communication Failure
ABSTRACT
This paper uses a donor-provider-agent framework to study the role of
provider incentives for the delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit,
or technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a situation where
credible communication by the provider is the key to successful delivery. The
study shows that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown
of communication between providers and agents, leading to undesirable out-
comes. The paper studies the interplay between incentives and communi-
cation in the presence of typical and motivated providers and nds that in
certain situations incentivization leads to worse outcomes.
Key Words: Incentives; Communication; Motivated Provider.
JEL Classication: D8; J3; O1; O3.
1 Introduction
Consider an agency situation where a donor (Principal) relies on a provider
(Intermediary) to deliver certain goods and services to a group of clients
(Agent). Various aspects of the delivery system have come under scrutiny
in recent times. A key recurring theme that has been emphasized in the
literature is the need to incentivize the providers or intermediaries respon-
sible for delivery of goods and services.1 For example, in the context of
foreign aid, it has been pointed out that the intermediaries may not have
the right kind of incentives to see that aid is spent e¤ectively (Easterly and
Pfutze (2008)). Likewise, in the context of micronance, a major cause for
concern is the issue of appropriate incentives for loan o¢ cers to achieve
the organizational goals of the micronance institutions (Armendariz de
Aghion and Murdoch (2004)). The role of incentives in the context of gov-
ernment bureaucracy and delivery of various social services has also been
a subject of investigation (Dixit (2002), Tirole (1994) and Wilson (1989)).
In many such agency settings, successful delivery and realization of
benets by the agents requires the provider to communicate relevant infor-
mation, which the provider must acquire at some cost before it can com-
municate. The objective of our paper is to show that while it is possible
to design an incentive scheme to induce the provider to acquire costly in-
formation, the incentive scheme can render the process of communication
ine¤ective. Using a simple example of targeted technology transfer, we
show how the use of high-powered incentives becomes counter-productive.
Consider for instance a farmer who is currently earning a xed, deter-
ministic income using traditional technology and is considering the adop-
tion of modern technology with stochastic outcomes. Relative to the tra-
1Even though we use a three tiered sturcture, our focus is on the interaction between
the provider and the agents. Makris (2009) studies a similar problem of incentives for
intermediaries providing non-marketable goods. Unlike the agency structure used here,
he focuses on a principal-agent framework.
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ditional technology, modern technology can lead to higher as well as lower
incomes. The chances of success depend on the characteristics (skill level)
of the farmer, the nature of the technology, and the environment in which
the farmer will operate it (state of nature).2 It is possible that the farmer,
though informed about his own characteristics, is unable to calculate the
success probabilities because of lack of information about the state of na-
ture. In such an event, even rational farmers may switch to the modern
technology with lower expected incomes because they are uninformed about
success probabilities.3 The question then is how to provide them with this
information in a credible manner.
In our setting, such information can be made available to the recipients
of the modern technology by the provider, to whom the donor provides
the funds for disbursement. It turns out that while providers can success-
fully communicate to the relevant agents in the absence of any incentives,
the communication process breaks down in the presence of high powered
incentives for providers. For a large class of incentive schemes, where the
providers compensation depends on the total number of successful projects,
her announcement regarding the non-suitability of the transfer for cer-
tain types (low success probability for modern technology) is non-credible.
Hence even though the relevant information is available, the agents do not
benet from it and we can obtain highly ine¢ cient outcomes. Since the
provider must incur some cost to acquire the relevant information before
it can communicate, we have a Catch-22 situation when this cost is non-
veriable and cannot be contracted. We need to have an incentive system
to induce the provider to acquire information, but by the creation of this
2An example in agriculture can be found in the adoption of High Yielding Variety
(HYV) seeds. While HYVs are certainly more productive, they are also more sensitive
to know-how and resource base of the recipient farmers.
3Note that in any such modernization process it is not possible to rule out lower
income ex post. But in the present context, for certain farmers or in certain cases,
modern technology may fail to dominate current practice in an expected sense.
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incentive we render the process of communication ine¤ective.
The situation is improved when we have motivated providers who would
acquire and communicate this agent-relevant information.4 These moti-
vated providers are driven by the mission to help the disadvantaged (low-
skilled in our context) and derive some private benets from doing so.
However, we also have non-motivated or typical providers who respond
only to pecuniary incentives. The agents have no way of knowing whether
they face a motivated or a typical provider. In the absence of any high-
powered incentives, the presence of these typical providers does not a¤ect
communication between motivated providers and the agents, but with the
introduction of incentives communication breaks down due to the presence
of the typical providers. Hence, in the presence of incentives, even the mo-
tivated providers are of little help. However, the negative implications of
incentivization can be avoided when the donor is able to use a richer set of
incentive schemes. Using state-dependent contracts, the typical providers
can be incentivized to acquire and communicate information truthfully.
Our paper is related to several strands in the literature and we draw
on many of these sources. Earlier papers by Dur and Swank (2005), and
Gerardi and Yariv (2008) have emphasized the interplay between the acqui-
sition and transmission of information by interested experts. In the case
of Dur and Swank (2005), unbiased experts exert maximum e¤ort, in a
moral hazard setting, to acquire information. Hence the principal is better
o¤ hiring an expert whose preference is less extreme than her own. Ger-
ardi and Yariv (2008) also look at costly information gathering but in their
solution the principal employs multiple experts with opposite preferences.
We study an entirely di¤erent agency setting where the motivated provider
(expert) is more likely to incur costly e¤ort to acquire information. Second,
4See Besley and Ghatak (2005) on the signicance of these motivated agents. Fran-
cois and Vlassopoulos (2008) o¤ers an exhaustive survey on the nature of prosocial
motivation and delivery of social services.
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the presence of the typical provider alongside the motivated provider does
not help the donor (principal) in addressing the problem of communication
failure.
The role and signicance of various types of motivations has received
attention from several economists recently. Besley and Ghatak (2005) point
out that it might be cheaper to address the moral hazard problem of induc-
ing e¤ort by careful matching of motivated agents rather than the use of
high-powered incentives. In our case, reliance on motivated agents may be
the only way of solving the problem of information acquisition and commu-
nication. While the claim that introduction of incentives can be counter-
productive because of demanding informational requirement is not new, a
more recent literature shows that even when incentives are appropriately
designed, we cannot be certain of e¢ cient outcomes. This can happen since
extrinsic motivations lead to crowding out of intrinsic motivations.5
In several principal-agent experimental settings, it has been noted that
stronger incentives and control induce weaker performance by the agent.
Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) show
that when agents care for esteem, material incentives may undermine es-
teem incentives. In our case, stronger material incentives do not crowd out
motivational incentives of these providers, but material incentives enable
the non-motivated providers to add noise to the communication process.
Signalling plays a key methodological role in many of these models
of motivations. Individuals have private information regarding own char-
acteristics and they try to signal these through generosity, superior per-
formances or esteem enhancing acts.6 Our model also involves signalling
5See Andreoni (1990), Benabou and Tirole (2003, 2006), Sliwka (2007), Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2008) among others.
6It is not the case that only agents engage in signalling. There are cases where the
principal also signals (through its choice of control, trust, incentive provision) about the
private information held by the principal. In Sliwka (2007), the principal chooses the
level of control over the agents to signal about the average level of trustworthy agents in
the population. In Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), the principal signals its altruistic
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by the provider (and not the agents) but it is costless. In that sense it is
closer to the literature on strategic information transmission and cheap talk
(Crawford and Sobel (1992), Farrell (1995), Krishna and Morgan (2001)).
It is well known that divergence of interests between the sender (provider)
and receiver (recipient) can lead to communication failure. Our paper uses
this intuition in a simple setting but with the added features that the sender
has to acquire information before communicating and that the nature of
incentive schemes for the provider has the potential to a¤ect the degree of
divergence in interests.
Finally, we do not make any general claims about the usefulness or
otherwise of incentive schemes. Ours is an extremely stylized model with
two-sided asymmetric information, which we elaborate in the text.7 How-
ever, the interplay of incentives and communication failure is the novel
feature of our analysis. Our exercise is a rst step in the direction that
shows that the interaction between communication and incentives can be
problematic.
Section 2 sets up the model and Section 3 has the results. The nal
section summarizes.
2 The Model
We consider a simple variant of the standard principal-agent framework
where there is a Donor who provides a xed amount of funds denoted
by M to a Provider, who then disburses the funds to the Recipients ( or
Agents). The donors role is limited to providing nancing and setting up
a compensation scheme for the provider. Most of the paper is about the
characteristics.
7In our model the provider does not know the skill level of the recipients but is aware
of the success probability of each type of recipient. The recipients on the other hand
know their types but do not know the success probability since they do not know the
state of the world.
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interaction between the provider and the agents.
Money from the donor is used to fund projects that are undertaken
by the agents. Each project costs an amount T ; hence a maximum of M
T
projects can be nanced. Note that the funding need not only be in the
form of cash transfers, it can also take the form of transfer of production
technology. We discuss the details of this technology transfer, payo¤s, and
strategies of the provider and agents below.
2.1 Agents
We assume that there exist two types of agents - high skill (h) and low skill
(l). The total population (of agents) is denoted by N = Nh+Nl where Nh
and Nl are the number of high-skilled and low-skilled agents respectively.
We denote by  the fraction of h-type agents in the population. Each
agent can supply 1 unit of labor in an inelastic manner and is assumed
to be risk neutral. In the absence of donor provided funds (which can be
interpreted as the subsistence sector using traditional technology) output
does not depend on skill type and is given by
Xi =  i = h,l (1)
where  > 0.
The transfer T enables the agents to pursue a project with varying
returns. For simplicity we consider only two outcomes: the project results
in output Yi > 0 when it is successful, and zero otherwise. The probability
of success for the h-type is given by ph > 0. For the low-skilled agents,
on the other hand, the project success probability depends on one or more
factors which are summarized by the state of nature . For simplicity, we
consider two possible states  2 fG;Bg where G denotes the good state
and B the bad state. The commonly held prior belief about the probability
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that  = G is given by  > 0. The success probabilities of the l-type are
given by plG and plB with ph > plG > plB > 0.
Output in the successful state and expected outputs for both types are
given below.
Yi =  i = h,l (2)
E(Yh) = ph (3)
E(Yl j  = G) = plG and E(Yl j  = B) = plB (4)
Note that  > . We assume that
plG >  > plB: (A1)
Thus when  = G, both types are better o¤ (in an expected sense) by
undertaking the project but the h-type is more likely to succeed. However
when  = B; the l-type is better o¤ using traditional technology and not
undertaking the project. To highlight the role of communication, we only
consider the case where the prior  is such that the low types will choose
to undertake the project, i.e.,
fplG + (1  )plBg >  (A2)
2.2 Provider
In our model the provider has two unique roles: (i) only she can distribute
funds to the agents, while being unable to identify their skill types; (ii)
only she can learn the true state  by incurring costly e¤ort e. We assume
that8
8More specically, the agents are able to observe whether the provider has undertaken
the e¤orts to learn : The donor may not oberve e; additionally the donor might consider
writing contracts (based on e¤ort) to be prohibitively expensive, and/or even when they
7
e¤ort e is observable but not contractible;with e 2 f0; 1g: (A3)
We focus on a class of performance based schemes where monetary
payments to the provider depend on the number of successful projects. Let
the number successful projects be denoted by m; which is observable and
veriable. To begin with, we consider a typical risk neutral provider whose
payo¤ is given by
U = Z(m)  d(e); Z=(m)  0, d(0) = 0 and d(1) = E > 0; (A4)
where d(e) is the disutility of e¤ort. This also includes xed compensation
scheme with Z(m) = Z: Later in Section 3.5 we consider more general
compensation schemes where Z depends on other observable variables too.
The providers reservation utility is denoted by U  0: Clearly, the donor
has to design a suitable incentive scheme for the provider so that the latter
undertakes the desired e¤ort to learn the realized .
2.3 Information and Time Line
We assume that the output parameters ; , the success probabilities ph; plG
and plB and the compensation scheme chosen by the donor are commonly
known. We assume that the agents (for whom this may be thought of as
new technology) and the donor do not know the realization of . In the
model the low-skilled agents know the success probabilities associated with
the good and bad state, but do not know . The provider learns the true
state through costly e¤ort and can communicate this by sending a signal
can be written, contracts may not be enforceable.
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S 2 fG;Bg to the agents. The donor is neither able to observe nor verify
this signal. We relax this assumption later, but it makes sense since the
donor is normally far removed from the eld. Finally, once all projects are
undertaken and outcomes realized, the donor can verify m. The sequence
of moves in this game is as follows.
1. Donor providesM to nance (M
T
) projects and species the providers
compensation scheme Z(m).
2. Provider chooses e;and if e = 1;makes announcement S 2 fG;Bg.9
3. Agents update their beliefs about  and choose whether to apply
(A) or not apply (NA) for the project.
4. Provider randomly selects a subset of all applicants (if the number
of applicants exceeds the total number of possible projects) and transfers
amount T to each of the selected agents. Let n be the total number projects
funded. Then nh and nl denote the number of high skill and low skill agents
selected to undertake the project respectively. Agents who are not selected
produce using the traditional technology.
5. Outputs are realized and the donor learns the number of successful
projects (m).
Our goal is to study the impact of various incentive schemes on the
interaction between the provider and agent. Hence our equilibrium den-
ition essentially captures the interaction in stages 2-3. An equilibrium is
given by fe; S; ag where e denotes the providers choice of e¤ort and
S is her signal if e = 1. Agent is choice is denoted by ai : fG;Bg  !
fA;NAg; i = l; h: Agents choose whether to apply or not apply based on
their posterior belief (S; ) : fG;Bg  [0; 1]  ! [0; 1]. In the absence
9There is no announcement when e = 0: Hence the observability of e¤ort decision is
integral to our analysis.
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of any communications, e = 0, agents choice is determined by the prior
belief :We now study the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of this game
(stage 2-3) assuming e = 1. For a given equilibrium, the corresponding
project allocations will be denoted by nh; n

l :
3 Results and Analysis
We rst illustrate the role of communication in our setup. Then we examine
e¢ ciency implications of incentive schemes for the providers and introduce
the motivated provider. Initially we focus on a single class of incentive
schemes where the providers compensation depends on the total number of
successful projects. Later in the section, we consider more general incentive
schemes.
3.1 Communication
In order to demonstrate the importance of communication, we begin with
the payo¤matrix shown below. These payo¤s are for illustration purposes
only and are not derived from the payo¤ specications discussed earlier.
Hence we have suppressed the e¤ort dimension here. The provider is des-
ignated as the row player and the low-skilled agent is the column player.
The rst element in each box refers to the providers payo¤ and the second
refers to the agents payo¤.10 The provider makes the announcement S
about  and the agent chooses whether to apply (A) or not (NA) in the
two di¤erent states. The payo¤s capture the idea that the agent is better
o¤ choosing NA in the bad state, and prefers A in the good state. More-
over, in the bad state, the provider also prefers the agent to choose NA. Of
10The high-skilled agent is missing from the analysis because her choice is not a¤ected
by the providers announcement.
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course, in the good state the providers preference over the agents choice
depends on the relationship between x and .
A NA
 = G x, X , 0
 = B 0,  Y 3, 0
Game 1
Suppose, x > , it is clear that communication is informative. It is easy
to verify that we have a PBE where
S(G) = G, S(B) = B,
a(B) = NA, a(G) = A,
(G; ) = 1, (B; ) = 0:
(5)
It is of course true that we also have the uninformative babblingequi-
librium where (S; ) = ; 8S. The agent learns nothing from the an-
nouncement by the provider and the providers equilibrium announcement
S(G) = S(B). We do not go in to equilibrium selection issues here and
assume that whenever the fully informative equilibrium exists, player will
choose to play according it.
Next suppose that x < . In the good state  = G, the providers payo¤
is higher whenever the (low-skilled) agent chooses NA. This makes the
announcement of S(B) = B non-credible because the agent realizes that
the provider would like the agent to believe the state to be B even when
 = G: Hence the equilibrium described in (5) cannot be sustained. In fact,
the only PBE in this case is the uninformative babbling equilibrium where
the agent chooses A irrespective of the announcement.
3.2 E¢ ciency
11
Suppose that for a given M , the donor is interested in maximizing to-
tal (expected) output V resulting from project allocations. This amounts
to maximizing total success probabilities. Let ni denote the number of
projects allocated to type-i agent in state :11 Hence the donor maximizes
V = [phnh + fplGnlG + (1  )plBnlBg]: (6)
We consider two benchmark cases where the agents know the realization of
the state . This implies that communication is irrelevant, we assume that
the donor does not employ any provider in these two cases. First consider
the case where, in addition to agents knowing ; information about skill
types are known by the donor (as well as the agents). Since the agents
know ; the outcome must satisfy the interim participation constraints,
E(Yi j )  Xi: Given (A1), it is clear that V is maximized, subject to
the participation constraints, by the following allocation.
nh =
M
T
, for Nh  M
T
(7)
nh = Nh, n

lG =
M
T
 Nh, and nlB = 0, for Nh <
M
T
Remark 1 We refer to this as the rst-best outcome. When Nh  MT , only
the high-skilled agents get the project in both states. In the complementary
case, Nh < MT ; low-skilled agents are allocated the remaining projects in the
good state but no projects in the bad state. The low-skilled agents who are
refused these projects can always use the traditional technology to produce
: Hence this does not involve welfare loss for the low-skilled agents in the
bad state.
11When the allocation of a type is same in both states, we will drop the  subscript
for convenient reading.
12
This outcome is clearly interim e¢ cient but ex post ine¢ ciency can-
not be ruled out because of the non-deterministic nature of the output.
Moreover, interim e¢ ciency requires that some amount of funds will re-
main unused when  = B, and Nh < MT : For the remainder of the paper
we will focus on the case when Nh  MT as this is su¢ cient to illustrate
the trade-o¤ between costly communication and incentives of the provider,
when we depart from the benchmark case.
Next consider the case where agents know  but the donor has no in-
formation about skill types. Hence projects are allocated randomly among
the applicants. In the context of our simple example, we have a nite set
of outcomes depending on how the di¤erent types apply in the two states.
When the low-skilled cannot be prevented from applying, it is clear that
expected output V is maximized when the low-skilled apply in the good
state but not in the bad state. The maximizing allocation is given below,
nhG = 
M
T
; nlG = (1  )
M
T
; nhB =
M
T
; nlB = 0 (8)
Remark 2 We refer to it as the second-best outcome. This outcome is
also interim e¢ cient. There are several other interim e¢ cient allocations
with nl > 0, satisfying E(Yi j )  Xi; but this allocation yields the highest
expected output in this class.
Finally, we could also consider a third case where the agents are un-
informed but the provider has information regarding the skill types. But
with Nh  MT , this case is equivalent to the rst-best outcome.
3.3 Incentives and Communication Failure
We now return to our model setting where the donor is uninformed about
 as well as skill types. The question we want to answer is whether the
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donor can achieve the e¢ cient outcomes described in (7) and (8) by hiring
a provider and providing suitable incentives.
Given that Nh  MT ; the rst-best outcome can only be achieved by
preventing the l-types from applying in the bad as well the good state, and
this is impossible to achieve. Recall that in the absence of any communi-
cation about the realized state, assumption (A2) implies that both types
will apply to undertake the project. For the low-skilled agents to revise
their prior belief we need (i) the provider to engage in costly e¤ort and
acquire information about the realized , and (ii) credibly communicate
this information. There is a basic tension between these two. Since e¤ort
is not contractible, the provider can only be incentivized by making their
compensation depend on the outcomes. Since the compensation scheme
is assumed to be common knowledge, the communication game between
the provider and l-type agents will have a payo¤ matrix that is similar to
the one specied in Game 1 with x < . We know that the only equi-
librium in this case is the uninformative babbling equilibrium.12 Hence
the benets of communication are non-existent and the provider is better
o¤ not acquiring any information. Thus for communication to be e¤ective
we need Z 0(m) = 0, but for the provider to acquire information we need
Z 0(m) > 0. Clearly it is not possible to have both simultaneously, render-
ing high-powered incentives completely ine¤ective. We summarize this in
our rst proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose (A1)-(A4) hold. Let Nh  MT . For any compen-
sation scheme Z(m), both types apply in all states and nh <
M
T
; nl > 0;
for  = G;B.
It is clear that neither of the e¢ cient outcomes can be achieved. It is
12In a related context, Macchiavello (2008) studies the role of public sector wage pre-
mium in screening and ensuring worker honesty. His focus is on the impact of such
incentive schemes on corruption, while we examine their impact on credible communi-
cation.
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easy to verify that in this case nh = 
M
T
; nl = (1   )MT ;  = G;B: The
total expected output V will be given by
V =

ph
M
T
+ fplGM
T
+ (1  )plBM
T
gf1  g

: (9)
Our objective has been to highlight the possible tension between incen-
tives and coomunication. It is clear that the donors strategy set has been
severely restricted and we can relax this. It is possible to consider direct
revelation mechanisms where donor makes transfers based on the signal,
or non-monotonic contracts where success over a certain limit is penalised
or nally state-dependent contracts where compensation depends on not
just success but also the state. Alternatively, we can leave the donor un-
changed (which is closer to our examples of aid provision or micronance)
but consider the possibility that providers are mission oriented to varying
degrees (see Besley and Ghatak (2005)) and care about things other than
monetary compensation. We turn to these in the next section.
3.4 Motivated Providers
We suppose that the motivated providers derive additional private benets
which are Rawlsian in nature: they seek to maximize the expected ben-
et to the most disadvantaged group   the low-skilled agents. Hence a
motivated providers utility depends on these private benets, compensa-
tion from the donor and possible disutility of e¤ort. The population of
providers consists of both the typical providers (denoted by ) and moti-
vated providers (denoted by ). We assume that the fraction of motivated
providers is .13 Recall that the typical providers simply maximize Z d(e);
13This fraction of motivated providers might depend on the nature of incentive schemes
due to self selection, but we do not address this issue. See Delfgaauw and Dur (2007)
for an analysis of incentive wages and workersself selection in rms.
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which we relabel as U  :
We now turn to the utility of the motivated providers. In state  = G;
the (marginal) expected benet to the l-type from the new technology will
be (plG   ) > 0 and the providers private benet is maximized when nl
is maximized. On the other hand, in state  = B the (marginal) expected
benet of the new technology to the low-skilled type will be (plB ) < 0
and the providers private benet is maximized when nl is minimized. Thus
the motivated providers private benets are state dependent. We can
rewrite the motivated providers payo¤ as
U = Z   d(e) + I()nlk   J()nlk0, k0; k > 0 (10)
where I() = 1 when  = G, and zero otherwise. Similarly, J() = 1 when
 = B and zero otherwise. The constants k; k0 reect the weights placed
by the provider on agents benet in di¤erent states.
From the above payo¤ function it also follows that, in the absence of
any incentives, for  = G the motivated provider prefers the l-types to un-
dertake the project. This implies that the motivated provider would like to
screen out the l-types in the bad state since they are better o¤ using tradi-
tional technology. An example of such motivated providers would be loan
o¢ cers working for a MFI who would not advance loans to someone that
is most likely to be severely indebted; not because the MFIs repayment
rates are going to be adversely a¤ected, but because the client is strictly
worse o¤.
3.4.1 Intrinsic Motivations Only
Suppose there are no extrinsic incentives for the providers, i.e. Z is xed
and not performance based. Then the motivated provider will choose e = 1
and communicate the realized state to the agents. The typical provider
16
chooses e = 0 and does not observe the realized state as e¤ort is costly.
We show that there is an equilibrium where the motivated provider
truthfully conveys information regarding the state and the l-types do not
apply in the bad state. Note that given the objective function of the mo-
tivated provider, the communication game resembles Game 1 with x  .
This means the provider would like the l-types to apply in the good state
but not in the bad state, making their announcement credible. Conse-
quently, the low skilled agent chooses its strategy as follows: a(G) = A,
and a(B) = NA: It is easy to verify that the typical provider does not have
any incentive to deviate and acquire information to take advantage of the
credibility of communication. Since compensation Z does not depend on
the outcome, doing so would simply lead a reduction in equilibrium payo¤
by d(1) = E. So in this setting, with probability  we get the outcome
where only the high types apply in the bad state and with probability
(1  ); we get the ine¢ cient outcome where all types apply in both states.
Equilibrium strategies are given by
e = 1, S

(G) = G, S

(B) = B;
ah = A; a

l (G) = A and a

l (B) = NA:
e = 0; a

h = a

l = A (11)
The corresponding allocation is given by
nhG = 
M
T
, nlG = (1  )
M
T
,
nhB = 
M
T
+ (1  )M
T
, nlB = (1  )(1  )
M
T
: (12)
When  = 1; this reduces to the second-best outcome (8) and expected
17
output is given by
V =

fphM
T
+ plG(1  )M
T
g+ (1  )phM
T

: (13)
It can be seen that expected output in (13) is higher than the expected
output under typical providers with incentives (9). Even when  < 1; the
above allocation with motivated providers and xed compensation domi-
nates the previous allocation listed in proposition 1. However, the rst-best
can never be achieved with the motivated providers, because the motivated
providers would always prefer the low skilled agents in the good state.
We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let Nh > MT . (a) When all providers are motivated,  = 1;
the second-best outcome shown in (8) can be achieved. (b) When some
providers are motivated,  > 0; the donor achieves higher expected output
compared to the case with only typical providers.
3.4.2 Intrinsic Motivations and Incentives
In the previous analysis, the presence of typical providers has no e¤ect
on the credible communication between the motivated providers and the
agents. But this is not necessarily true when the provider is incentivized
with Z 0(m) > 0. For the motivated provider this does not change any of the
equilibrium strategies for su¢ ciently large values of k and k0. Consider the
equilibrium strategies given in (11) and the corresponding outcome. The
motivated providers e¤ort choice is still given by e = 1. It is clear that
they will choose to communicate truthfully in the bad state. But will they
choose S = G when the realized state is G? There may exist situations
depending on the proportion of high-skilled agents (), where Z(m) can
be lower according to the equilibrium strategy in (11). However it is easy
to show that there exists k  k such that the motivated provider will not
18
deviate to S = B, where k is given by the solution to the following14
Z(ph
M
T
) = Z

ph
M
T
+ plG(1  )M
T

+ (1  )M
T
k: (14)
But the incentive scheme has a signicant impact on the typical providers
strategies. Given the strategies of the motivated provider and the agents,
the typical provider will benet from deviating to e = 1 and s(G) = B if
the following is satised,
Z(ph
M
T
)  E  Z

ph
M
T
+ plG(1  )M
T

+ (1  )Z

ph
M
T

: (15)
The right hand side expression in (15) is the payo¤ to the typical provider
in such an equilibrium, but with Z 0(m) > 0: For given e¤ort level and ;
this condition depends on the slope of the compensation function Z. The
slope can be interpreted as the power of the incentive scheme, with a higher
value of the slope implying high-powered incentives. If compensation is
highly responsive to the outcome (in this case m) then the typical provider
will deviate. Suppose, Z(m) = z:m. Then the equilibrium outcome given
by (15) cannot be sustained if z > z0; where z0 is given by
z0(ph   plG)(1  )M
T
= E: (16)
Once the typical provider also makes announcements, the agents have
no way of separating the typical providers announcement from that of the
motivated provider. The signal B could come from a typical provider in
state G, or it could come from both types of providers in state B. It can be
checked that the posterior belief that the state is good, when e = e = 1
and the signal is B; is (G j B) = ( )
1   : Note that for a given prior
14In the context of crowding out, as discussed earlier, this can be interpreted as
intrinsic motivation being su¢ ciently strong.
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, the agents posterior belief  is determined by the fraction of motivated
providers : A high value of  induces the l-type agents to apply. Hence,
when there are large number of typical providers and agentsbelief about
the underlying state being good is high, all agents will apply even when the
state is bad. Since, according to assumption (A2), plG + (1   )plB > 
and   !  as   ! 0; there exists 0 such that
plG + (1  )plB  

for all   0: (17)
Hence the introduction of high-powered schemes leads to a communica-
tion failure even in the presence of motivated providers if these incentives
are powerful enough to induce costly information gathering by the typical
providers. This is summarized below.
Proposition 3 Consider linear compensation schemes Z(m) = z:m with
high-powered incentives z > z0 (ref 16). When the fraction of motivated
providers is small,  < 0 (ref 17), in any equilibrium both types of agents
apply in all the states.
This suggests that when faced with a mixed population of motivated and
typical providers, the donor is better o¤ not using any incentive schemes.
Information acquisition by the typical providers adds noise to the commu-
nication by the motivated providers and it leads to lower expected output.
3.5 State-Dependent Contracts: An Illustration
The previous analysis shows how intrinsic motivations could be e¤ective
where extrinsic motivations through incentives failed to do so. However, in
our previous example, the donor was restricted to a small class of contracts
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based on total number of successes or failures. Suppose the donor can
observe and verify the state ex post and condition compensation contracts
on the realization of : Using this expanded set of feasible contracts we can
show that extrinsic motivations can be made to work. However, it may
be hard to verify  in many situations and motivated providers remain the
best answer in such scenarios.
Since motivated providers do not need any incentivization and our re-
sult concerning ine¤ectiveness of incentivization (Proposition 1) had only
typical providers, here also we conne attention to a world with typical
providers only and drop the subscript  . As is obvious from Proposition 1
and analysis in Section 3.3, high-powered incentives lead to communication
failure because in state  = G, the provider has an incentive to dissuade
the l-types from applying by announcing B: Hence the providers prefer-
ence over types in the good state is responsible for undermining credibility.
We can design an incentive scheme where the provider has an incentive
to acquire information but at the same time, it is not a¤ected by which
types apply in the good state. Since states are ex post veriable and hence
contractible we can consider the following contract:
Z = Z if  = G, Z = Z   (nl + nh  m)f if  = B; (18)
where Z is some xed payment and f is the penalty for each unsuccessful
project. We can nd suitable Z and f such that the following participation
and incentive constraints are satised.
Z   (1  )(1  ph)M
T
f   E  U; (19)
(1  )M
T
f(1  )(ph   pl)  E  0: (20)
It is easy to verify that such a compensation scheme is feasible and
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the provider will choose e = 1. Moreover, in state  = G, the provider
has no incentive to lie and choose S = B: Likewise, in state  = B, an
announcement of S = G will lead to a lower payo¤ for the provider. Hence,
we have an equilibrium where
e = 1, S() = ; for  = G;B, (21)
ah = A, a

l (G) = A, a

l (B) = NA:
Clearly, this will lead to an allocation given by nhG = 
M
T
; nlG = (1  
)M
T
; nhB =
M
T
; nlB = 0: Hence the second-best outcome can be achieved
by this contract. Note that this is the same outcome which can be achieved
with motivated providers. Expected output from donors perspective will
be
V =

ph
M
T
+ plG(1  )M
T
+ (1  )phM
T

: (22)
In our simple example, the provider can use other contracts too.15 Since
we have two states and two types, the number of successful projects can
be ordered according to states. Let m1 be the number of successes when
only high-skilled types undertake projects, and the number of successful
projects with both types applying in good and bad states will be given by
m2 and m3 respectively. Clearly, m1 > m2 > m3: Consider the following
contract:
Z = Z; if m  m3   ; and (23)
Z = 0; otherwise, for 0 <  < m3  m2: (24)
This is identical to the state-dependent contract discussed earlier. Observe
that the provider is not a¤ected by the presence of low-skilled agents in the
15These need not be state dependent but serve the same purpose as the state depen-
dent contract.
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good state and hence communication is credible.
3.6 Donors Objectives
The above discussion has brought out the donors objective into the picture.
Throughout we have assumed that the donor is interested in maximizing
total expected output. However, it is not the case that donors have to be
interested in maximizing returns on every dollar spent. Suppose the donor
is interested in only avoiding the worst case, i.e. preventing low-skilled
agents from undertaking the project in the bad state but has no preference
over types in the good state.16 Hence the donor does not care about nlG or
nh: Such a donor can use a contract similar to (18) where failed projects in
state B are penalized. If the donor can identify the di¤erent failed types
then we could even target only failures by l-types in the bad state. With
such a contract the interests of the providers, both motivated as well as
typical, are aligned with the interests of the agents. Hence the donor can
achieve an allocation with nlB = 0:
When the donor cares only about successful projects the total number
of success is bounded above by what is implied by the second-best outcome.
The best an output maximizing donor can do is identical to what a donor,
who is interested in avoiding the worst case scenario, would do to prevent
low-skilled agents from undertaking the project in the bad state. Thus
the output maximizing donor is observationally equivalent to the one who
wants to avoid the worst case outcome.
16This would of course include the case where the donor would like the low-skilled
agents to get the project in the good state. If wealth and skill level are positively
correlated, one can justify such objectives.
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4 Conclusion
E¤ective delivery is a critical component of development e¤orts. Using
a simple and stylized setting, we have shown that introduction of high-
powered incentives can lead to communication failure and undermine the
very reasons for the introduction of incentives. Despite the context-specic
nature of our example, our analysis is relevant to the general case of pro-
visioning of goods and services identied by two distinctive features: non-
commercial intent and reliance on non-price allocation mechanisms. Ex-
amples of these are transfer of modern technology, technological know-how,
loans and grants as well as aid to the poor. This framework can also be used
to study programs like the provisioning of health services, education and
many other public goods. Whenever agentsrelevant characteristics are not
commonly observed, communication is important and informational prob-
lems arise in the absence of e¤ective communication. The severity of the
problem can be gauged by the fact that in these situations, even though
some types of agents are likely to be worse o¤ than their current status,
they end up receiving the transfers.
An instance of such communication failure and ine¢ cient uptake can
be found in the recent micro-lending programs of several micronance in-
stitutions. A major crisis broke out in March 2006 when around 50 MFI
branches in Andhra Pradesh (a state in India) were closed by the govern-
ment because of complaints against practices of these organizations. Some
authors, while analyzing this incident, commented on how indiscriminate
lending was making a debt trapfor the poor.17 It is argued that several
individuals who (ex ante) had a very small chance of repaying the loans
also entered into debt contracts. This was possible because of a breakdown
in credible communication between the loan o¢ cers and the individuals.
17See Shylendra (2006) and Kumar (2006) for detailed accounts and analysis of this
incident.
24
Excessive incentivization of the loan o¢ cers to maximize the number of
clients can be listed as a major cause of this counter-productive outcome.18
While our result is related to the recent literature on intrinsic and ex-
trinsic motivation, the emphasis on information ows and communication
is a novel feature. We show that while the introduction of extrinsic mo-
tivations or incentives does not destroy the intrinsic motivations of the
motivated providers, it makes the typical provider act in such a manner
that communication between the motivated providers and agents breaks
down.
Based on our stylized model, we believe that there are two issues which
need to be noted. First, we have assumed (in most of the paper) that the
number of high skilled agents exceeds the number of projects that can be
nanced. If this is not true then in some states the entire amount of funds
supplied by the donor will not be spent. Donors who prefer full utilization
(or disbursement) of funds will consider this outcome ine¢ cient. But on
the other hand, in the bad state where the low-skilled agents are better o¤
not undertaking the project, it is better to have undisbursed funds. We
only make a partial reference to this issue since it is not the main focus of
our paper and does not generate additional insights. Second, the provider
relies on a random allocation when the number of applications exceeds the
number of projects to be nanced. Since our focus was on communication,
in our model the provider can a¤ect the nal allocation only by commu-
nicating the state-related information to inuence the agentsdecision to
apply for projects. In practice however, the provider might undertake costly
screening of the applications, an issue that has been left for future research.
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